William & Mary Business Law Review
Volume 9 (2017-2018)
Issue 1

Article 2

November 2017

Maximizing Ponzi Loss Deductions for Estate and Income Tax
Purposes: Are Taxpayers Better Off Dead?
Valrie Chambers
Brian Elzweig

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Estates and Trusts Commons

Repository Citation
Valrie Chambers and Brian Elzweig, Maximizing Ponzi Loss Deductions for Estate and Income
Tax Purposes: Are Taxpayers Better Off Dead?, 9 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 1 (2017),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr/vol9/iss1/2
Copyright c 2017 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr

MAXIMIZING PONZI LOSS DEDUCTIONS
FOR ESTATE AND INCOME TAX PURPOSES:
ARE TAXPAYERS BETTER OFF DEAD?
VALRIE CHAMBERS
BRIAN ELZWEIG**
ABSTRACT
There is a long history of cases interpreting whether a theft
loss deduction for securities fraud is allowable for personal income
taxes. The cases require that for a theft loss to be actionable as such,
it would have to meet the requirements of the common law definition of theft in the U.S. state in which it occurred. This generally
requires direct privity between the person claiming the loss and
the person who committed the theft. Because most securities transactions are brokered, the direct privity is lost and a theft loss deduction is denied in favor a capital loss. Recently, in a case of
first impression, the Tax Court was presented with a similar issue
involving the worth of assets for estate taxes. Instead of using the
reasoning presented in income tax cases, the Tax Court allowed a
theft loss deduction on estate taxes where a Ponzi scheme was uncovered while the estate owned a limited liability company. The
sole assets of the company were shares of the security that was
involved in the Ponzi scheme. This Article examines the history of
the privity requirement for deducting a theft loss for income taxes
and how that reasoning now differs from the tax treatment for
estate taxes. The Article concludes that there should not be a difference in treatment and that direct privity should not be required
for either income or estate taxes.
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INTRODUCTION
A 2016 Tax Court case, Estate of James Heller v. Commissioner,1 examined whether a fraud loss from a Ponzi scheme
investment is theft loss for estate tax returns in a case of first
impression. And, viewed through a lens of the common meaning
of fraud being a theft, combined with some indications that the
position for denying a theft loss deduction to individuals in some
cases is softening, this appears to be a fair and reasonable result.
For income taxes, however, defrauded Ponzi scheme victims generally cannot take a deduction for theft loss on individual income
tax returns, unless they were in direct privity with the party
selling the Ponzi scheme investment.2 Instead, for income tax
purposes, fraud losses in the absence of privity are generally
treated as capital losses, which are extinguished without carryover beyond the taxpayer’s final tax return.3 This leads to an
anomalous conclusion that, for theft loss deduction purposes only,
the taxpayer, James Heller (Heller), may have been better off
dead when the fraud was discovered.
This Article discusses the Heller case, Internal Revenue
Code (Code) § 2054, and commonalities with case rulings and
judicial comments where living individuals would also be allowed
a theft loss after a fraud under Code § 165(c) and the impact of
Heller on these.4 It then discusses the difference in financial effect
for Heller had the court interpreted § 2054 in a manner consistent
with § 165(c) and the history of the § 165(c) tax treatment. It concludes with a recommendation in support of the Heller decision
and in extending the court’s reasoning to similar § 165(c) cases
where the taxpayer is still alive.5
I. THE HELLER CASE AND THEFT LOSS FOR ESTATE TAXES
At the time of his death on January 31, 2008, Heller had a
99 percent interest in the James Heller Family LLC (JHF), the
Estate of James Heller v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. No. 11, at *1 (2016).
See I.R.C. § 165(e) (Supp. II 2012); see also Adkins v. United States, 113
Fed. Cl. 797, 804 (2013).
3 I.R.C. § 165(g) (Supp. II 2012).
4 See infra Part I.
5 See infra Section II.B and Conclusion.
1
2
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sole asset of which was an account with Madoff Securities.6 Each
of Heller’s two children held a 0.5 percent interest, accounting
for the remainder of the assets of JHF.7 From 1999 through 2007,
Heller personally contributed $6,052,000 to the account and withdrew $12,429,781.8 On December 19, 2006, the LLC contributed
an additional $150,000 and on January 3, 2007, Heller transferred a
balance shown of $14,850,000 from his personal account to JHF.9
JHF withdrew $11,500,000 from the securities account and
distributed 99 percent of this amount ($11,385,000) to the estate
of James Heller (Estate), to pay its taxes and administrative
expenses.10 On December 11, 2008, Bernard Madoff (Madoff),
the head of the securities firm, was arrested for, and later pled
guilty to, securities fraud.11 Madoff later admitted that Madoff
Securities was a Ponzi scheme that was perpetuated by the fabrication of periodic account statements.12 After the revelation of
the Ponzi scheme, the approximately $5,000,000 balance owned
by JHF in the Madoff Securities fund, became worthless, thus
making JHF worthless.13 The Estate claimed that balance as a
theft loss deduction on a timely filed federal estate tax return.14
The return showed a gross estate of $26,296,807, which included
$16,560,990 as the value of Heller’s 99 percent stake in JHF,
and claimed a $5,175,990 theft loss related to the Ponzi scheme.15
The deduction was calculated as the value of the Estate’s interest
in JHF as reported on the estate tax return minus the Estate’s
share of the amounts withdrawn from the account.16 The IRS
agreed that a fraud loss occurred but claimed that JHF was entitled to the theft loss, not the Estate.17 The IRS disallowed the
deduction on the basis that a theft was not perpetrated against
6 Heller,

147 T.C. No. 11 at *1.

7 Id.
8

Id. at *1 n.3.

9 Id.

Id. at *1.
Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at *2.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
10
11
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the Estate and issued a notice of deficiency to the Estate for the
tax on that deduction.18 The Estate challenged that determination in tax court, moving for summary judgment.19 Based on its
assertion that JHF incurred the theft loss, not the Estate, the
IRS filed an opposing motion for partial summary judgment.20
The sole issue in Heller was, given that JHF (which was
99 percent owned by the taxpayer) was the owner of the fraudulent account, whether the taxpayer was eligible for a theft loss
deduction for the fraud loss suffered by the Estate as a result of
the Ponzi scheme.21 While similar cases of whether a fraud loss
is a theft loss exist for federal individual income taxes,22 the court
noted that whether a fraud loss is a theft loss for estate tax purposes under § 2054 was a case of first impression.23
A. The Estate Tax
The estate tax is imposed on the taxable estate, which is
the value of the net assets transferred to beneficiaries.24 The
estate tax does not tax income from those assets or other work,
although to the extent that the estate’s assets earn income in the
period that the estate is open, that income may also be taxed.25
Thus, the savings on income can essentially be taxed twice: once
when earned as income, and again after what was saved is passed
on to heirs.26
The taxable estate is the value of the gross estate27 less
allowable deductions,28 which include funeral expenses, administrative expenses of the estate, estate indebtedness, and taxes.29
18

Id.

19 Id.

Id.
Id. at *1.
22 See Vietzke v. Comm’r, 37 T.C. 504, 512 (1961); see also Jensen v.
Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 543, 546ï47 (1993).
23 Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *2.
24 I.R.C. § 2001 (2012).
25 Id.
26 Id. § 641.
27 Id. § 2031(a).
28 Id. § 2051.
29 Id. § 2053(a).
20
21
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Transfers to qualified charities30 and to one’s surviving spouse31
are also deducted in arriving at the amount of the taxable estate.
A unified credit is provided for all estates and lifetime taxable
gifts, ensuring that small estates are not subject to the estate tax.32
Currently, this credit translates to excluding the first $5,000,000
of lifetime taxable gifts and estate value, indexed for inflation.33
In arriving at the taxable estate, § 2054 also allows for
deductions from the gross estate of “losses incurred during the
settlement of estates arising from fires, storms, shipwrecks, or
other casualties; or from theft, when such losses are not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.”34 Using Black’s Law Dictionary to define the term “loss,” the court in Heller found that “[i]n
that context, a loss refers to a reduction of the value of property
held by an estate.”35
B. Tax Court’s Ruling in Heller
In summary judgment, the court upheld the theft loss deduction for the Estate under § 2054.36 The court’s reasoning was
that, while the LLC incurred a loss of its sole asset due to fraud,
the Estate also incurred a loss in the value of the gross estate
because the fair market asset value of JHF declined.37 The court
reasoned that again, based on plain meaning, a theft loss deduction is allowed provided that there is a sufficient nexus between
the theft and the estate’s loss.38 The court opined that there was
an undisputed and direct nexus between the theft and the value
of the estate’s interest in JHF.39 To make its assertion, the court
relied on White v. Commissioner.40 In White, the court found that
Id. § 2055(a).
Id. § 2056(a).
32 Id. § 2010(c)(3)(A).
33 Id. In the year of Heller’s death, the estate tax rules were different, but
the size of the gross estate and the unified credit for that year were not in
dispute. See Estate of James Heller v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. No. 11, at *2 (2016).
34 I.R.C. § 2054 (2012) (emphasis added).
35 Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *2.
36 Id. at *3.
37 Id. at *2.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. (citing White v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 430, 435 (1967)).
30
31
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where an “other casualty” arose from41 direct and proximate damage, similar to that of casualties specifically enumerated in
§ 165(c)(3), the other casualty should receive casualty loss treatment.42 Passing the stricter test of direct privity between the
fraudster and the victim, as is commonly used for determining
whether there is a deductible theft loss for income tax purposes,
is not required.43 The court reasoned that the deduction was
“consistent with the overall statutory scheme of the estate tax”44
because the purpose of the estate tax is to impose a tax on “the
net estate, which is really what of value passes from the dead to
the living.”45
II. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CAPITAL LOSS AND THEFT LOSS
TREATMENT FOR INCOME TAXES
As a case of first impression, Heller does not contradict
existing regulations or legislative history pertaining to § 2054.
This decision recognizes that there was, for estate tax purposes,
a decline in the asset value of the estate arising from a theft or
other casualty.46 Further, Heller does not directly contradict
dissimilar rulings on what constitutes a theft for income tax
purposes under § 165(c).47 However, because the language of the
two Code sections48 is strikingly similar, the court could have
used a line of cases interpreting § 165(c) as persuasive authority,
which tends to eschew a plain reading of the statute. Instead,
the court in Heller chose to do plain meaning analysis,49 leaving
what can be interpreted as differing standards between what is
a theft loss for estate purposes and for income tax purposes,
41 White v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 430, 435 (1967). The court further noted that the
term “arising from” is a broad phrase that even encompasses casual connections.
See United States v. Bradford, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1003 (N.D. Iowa 2006).
42 White, 48 T.C. at 435.
43 See, e.g., Taghadoss v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-44, at *3 (2008);
Paine v. Comm’r, 63 T.C. 736, 737, 742ï43 (1975).
44 Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *3.
45 Id. (quoting Jacobs v. Comm’r, 34 B.T.A. 594, 597 (1936)).
46 Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *2–3.
47 See Taghadoss, T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-44 at *3; see also Paine v. Comm’r,
63 T.C. 736, 741 (1975).
48 I.R.C. § 165(c) (2012); id. § 2054.
49 Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *2.
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which could lead to confusion. Where a theft loss would be disallowed for income tax purposes, the tax treatment of the loss
would receive long-term capital loss treatment resulting from
worthless securities.50 If that treatment were to be applied in
Heller, the capital loss deduction would be limited to $3,000 in
excess of capital gains,51 not $5,175,990 as claimed by the Estate.
This difference in deduction amounts would be substantial for
most families.
A. Capital Loss Treatment for Income Tax
For individuals, capital losses offset capital gains on securities in the year of sale52 or when the security becomes totally
worthless, where they are treated as being sold for zero dollars
on the last day of the tax year.53 Where capital losses offset capital gains, the tax savings on those losses can be as high as 20
percent plus Net Investment Income Tax at a rate of 3.8 percent.54
Each year, the first $3,000 of capital losses in excess of capital
gains, if any, offsets ordinary income at ordinary income tax
rates,55 with the remaining capital losses being carried forward
until the earlier of their exhaustion or individual’s final income
tax return.56 Estates are also limited by the $3,000 per year constraint, but unused capital losses pass through to the heirs
while maintaining their capital loss attributes.57 Consequently,
a large loss net of capital gains can take many years, or worse,
may never be recouped.
B. Theft Loss Treatment for Income Taxes
The IRS and the courts traditionally rely on state law to
define a theft, which bears little to no relation to the definition
I.R.C. § 165(g) (Supp. II 2012).
Id. § 1211(b).
52 A decline in fair market value of securities held does not qualify as a deductible capital loss (Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(f) (2008)), except where a security
becomes worthless. § 165(g).
53 Id.
54 Id. § 1411(a).
55 Id. § 1211.
56 Rev. Rul. 74-175, 1974-1 C.B. 52; see also I.R.C. § 1212(a)(1) (2012).
57 Treas. Reg. § 1.642(h)-1 (2016).
50
51
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of securities fraud used by the federal government. State laws
differ, but most require direct privity or the intent to defraud on
the part of the person taking a victim’s money.58 In Heller, had
traditional state law reasoning been applied, it might be argued
that Heller funded the Madoff account, and had the fraud been
discovered while Heller owned the account, he could have taken
a theft loss deduction on his individual income tax return.59
However, Heller contributed that account to the formation of
JHF, with no indication of economic loss, and therefore, no theft
loss deduction at that time.60 JHF sustained the fraud loss when
the Ponzi scheme was uncovered.61 JHF, however, would be ineligible for a theft loss under most state laws because there was
not privity between JHF and Madoff.62 There was privity between JHF and Heller, but Heller did not intend to permanently
deprive JHF of its assets.63 Further, since Heller was not the
sole owner of JHF, JHF was a distinct entity, not a disregarded
entity.64 Thus, the fraud loss of $5,175,990 would be treated as a
long-term § 165(g) worthless security, capital loss until the estate
is terminated, and then it would be passed to the beneficiaries,
retaining its capital loss character.65 Were the two children the
two heirs of the Estate, they would each receive a capital loss
flow-through of $2,587,995 each. If the heirs had no other capital
losses, they would take $3,000 per year through the earlier of
their final federal individual tax return (due to their own death)
or 862 years, with $1,995 taken in their 863rd year.66 Should they
die first, the unused capital loss carryforward is lost permanently.67
See Adkins v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 797, 804 (2013).
See generally id. (hypothesizing that if the fraud was discovered while
Heller owned and funded the Madoff account, privity would exist between
Heller and Madoff, making a deduction proper).
60 Estate of James Heller v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. No. 11, at *1 (2016).
61 Id. at *2.
62 Id.
63 Id. at *1.
64 Id.
65 I.R.C. § 165(g) (Supp. II 2012).
66 You can deduct capital losses up to the amount of your capital gains
plus $3,000. The carryforward would take 863 years because $2,587,995,
divided by $3,000 per year, equals 862 years, plus the $1,995 in year 863.
I.R.S. Instructions for Schedule D, Cat. No. 24331I (Oct. 19, 2016).
67 Id.
58
59
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1. History of § 165(c)(3)

Section 165 of the Internal Revenue Code allows individuals to deduct “any loss sustained during the taxable year and not
compensated for by insurance or otherwise ...68 [that] shall be
limited to ... losses of property not connected with a trade or
business or a transaction entered into for profit, if such losses arise
from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.”69
Theft is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary,70 but it is not defined
in the Code. Courts have historically relied on state laws to define
theft under Revenue Ruling 72-112.71 Edwards v. Bromberg72
broadly defines theft loss as any criminal appropriation of another’s property, including swindling, false pretenses or any other
form of guile including blackmail, embezzlement and other frauds,
extortion, kidnapping for ransom, larceny, robbery, and threats.73
The laws of the location of the incident determine whether a taking is a theft. To be a theft, the taking must be illegal and done
with criminal intent.74 Generally, the tax treatment of theft
losses parallels that of casualty losses.75 Government seizures and
confiscations, lost property,76 and reduction in the resale value
of property77 are not thefts.
Theft losses are deductible in the later of the year of discovery or when there is no reasonable prospect of recovery. 78
I.R.C. § 165(a).
Id. § 165(c)(3).
70 The term “theft” means the fraudulent taking of personal property belonging to another, from his possession of some person holding the same from
him, without his consent, with intent to deprive the owner of the value of the
same, and to appropriate it to the use or benefit of the person taking. Theft,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1477 (6th ed. 1990).
71 Rev. Rul. 72-112, 1972-1 C.B. 60.
72 Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1956).
73 Id.
74 See Rev. Rul. 72-112 1972-1 C.B. 60 for U.S. theft losses requiring application of state law. For foreign thefts, see First Chi. Corp. v. Comm’r, 69
T.C.M. (CCH) 2089, 2097 (1995).
75 See I.R.C. § 162 for losses on property used in a trade or business, § 212
for income producing activities of individuals, and § 165(c)(3) for losses on
personal use property. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.165-8(d) (as amended in 1964).
76 See Powers v. Comm’r, 36 T.C. 1191, 1193 (1961).
77 See Pulvers v. Comm’r, 407 F.2d 838, 839 (1967).
78 See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2)(i) (as amended in 1977); see also Geisler
v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1734, 1736 (1988). The taxpayer has the burden
68
69
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Where there is a reasonable prospect of recovery, the loss is sustained in the year when one can reasonably determine whether
a recovery will be received.79 A taxpayer must make reasonable
efforts to recover stolen property and seek reimbursements from
insurers.80 Each tax year that recovery is sought, the prospects
for recovery must be re-evaluated, and, where prospects for recovery remain long enough, the statute of limitations for deducting a theft loss may actually bar recovery.81 Deduction can be
denied where there is an unreasonable delay beyond the threeyear statute of limitations.82 Objective factors in determining
the year of the theft loss include the existence of litigation of a
claim and the availability of restitution.83 A subjective factor may
be considered but cannot be the controlling or sole criterion.84
Theft losses on investments are deductible at ordinary income tax rates without regard to the 10 percent of adjusted gross
income and the $100 per incident floors, provided taxpayers
itemize deductions.85 Theft loss deductions are not subject to
itemized deduction phase-out.86
Relatively large theft losses can create a net operating
loss (NOL),87 which is normally carried back to offset taxes paid
of proof for what is “no reasonable prospect.” Gale v. Comm’r, 41 T.C. 269,
276 (1963).
79 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(3); see also Jeppsen v. Comm’r, 128 F.3d 1410,
1414 (10th Cir. 1997). Such a recovery could come from an insurer, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, or a net collectible amount of damages
from court awards. See id.
80 I.R.C. § 165(h)(4)(E) (Supp. II 2012).
81 Woltman v. United States, 56 A.F.T.R.2d. (RIA) 5860, 5863 (S.D. Cal. 1985).
82 Id. Woltman could have filed a formal disclaimer of any recovery in the
year the theft was discovered, allowing him to claim the theft loss then. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2)(i).
83 Huey v. Comm’r, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 430, 434 (1985). Merely filing a proof
of claim in bankruptcy and other ministerial acts, however, is not a strong
indicator of recovery. Jensen v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 543, 547 (1993); see
Adkins v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 797, 807 (2013). All facts and circumstances must be considered. For example, in Schneider v. Comm’r, 49 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1032, 1033ï34 (1985), the taxpayer filed a lawsuit but the perpetrator
had no assets from which to recover. The court found the lack of assets more
persuasive than the presence of a lawsuit. Id.
84 Adkins, 113 Fed. Cl. at 807.
85 I.R.C. § 165(c)–(h) (Supp. II 2012).
86 Id. § 68(c)(3).
87 Id. § 172(d)(4)(c).
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in the last two years and then carried forward for up to twenty
years.88 However, to the extent that an NOL arises from theft
losses, the carryback period is three years.89 An election can be
made to forego NOL carryback.90
Fraud may be treated as a nonbusiness bad debt which
receives short-term capital loss treatment91 rather than as a theft,
as in the case of Stoltz v. United States,92 where a taxpayer guaranteed a loan for a friend who misrepresented his ability to repay.
Fraud losses may be split between capital losses and amending
previous tax returns, as in the case of Kaplan v. United States,93
where a couple invested in a Ponzi scheme, declaring fictitious
income as reported on false statements before the fraud was discovered.94 The initial investment was treated as capital loss, and
the bogus income was corrected on previous returns where the
statute of limitations had not yet barred. 95 Fraud loss may be
split between capital loss and theft loss96 where a company began to engage in fraud after having operated legitimately.97 Investments made before the fraud received capital loss treatment
and investments made after the fraud had started were treated
as theft losses.98
2. Safe Harbor Provisions for Qualified Ponzi Scheme Victims
Victims of a Ponzi scheme have relief available from Revenue Ruling 2009-9, which allows victims to claim an estimated
theft loss in the year of discovery without regard to whether a
partial recovery might result.99 The amount of the theft loss is
equal to the original basis plus previously declared dividend and
capital gain income that was reinvested in the scheme, less money
Id. § 172(b)(1)(A).
Id. § 172(b)(1)(F).
90 Id. § 172(b)(3).
91 Id. § 166(d).
92 Stoltz v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 2d 734, 739 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
93 Kaplan v. United States, 100 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5674, 5678 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
94 Id. at 5675
95 Id. at 5682.
96 I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 200811016 (Mar. 14, 2008).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Rev. Rul. 2009-9, 2009-14 I.R.B. 735.
88
89
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recovered to date.100 No amendments of previous tax returns are
required, eliminating the danger that the statute of limitations
on the loss may bar before the potential for recovery is determined with reasonable certainty.
A taxpayer qualifies for this relief if the taxpayer is a
qualified investor who, unaware of the fraud, transferred funds
to the “lead figure”101 who promoted a “specified fraudulent arrangement”102 resulting in an investment loss. A fraud conviction is not necessary, but the lead figure must be: (1) indicted for
fraud, embezzlement or other theft loss; or (2) the subject of an
ongoing state or federal criminal complaint where that complaint: (a) alleged an admission by the lead figure; (b) the assets
of the arrangement have been frozen; or (c) a receiver/trustee
was appointed with respect to the assets of the fraudulent arrangement.103 The taxpayer must otherwise be allowed a theft
loss under § 165104 or Regulation 1.165-1105 and the fraudulent
investment must not be a tax shelter.106
Safe harbor relief only applies to Ponzi schemes where the
lead figure: (1) receives property or cash from investors; (2) purports to earn investor income; (3) reports at least partially fictitious
investor income; and (4) misappropriates some of the investors’
cash or property.107 No safe harbor relief is available for: (1) unpaid loans from fraudsters to an investor; (2) investment fee
deductions paid to the fraudsters; (3) undeclared fraudulent income;
and (4) indirect investments in Ponzi schemes where cash or
property was paid to a non-fraudulent fund or entity that in
turn invested in the scheme.108
Revenue Procedure 2009-20 provides that the taxpayer may
deduct either 95 percent of the net investment loss where the taxpayer agrees to pursue no recovery from a third party, or 75 percent
Id.
Claire H. Taylor, Helping Defrauded Investors Recoup Losses with the
Tax Code: Advice for Litigators, 21 No.2 PIABA B.J. 225, 240 (2014).
102 Id. at 240–41.
103 Id.
104 I.R.C. § 165(c) (Supp. II 2012).
105 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1 (as amended in 1977).
106 For a definition of a tax shelter, see I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(c)(ii) (2012).
107 Taylor, supra note 101, at 226.
108 Brian Elzweig, Valrie Chambers & Jud Stryker, After Goeller v. United
States, Can the Theft Loss Treatment Now Be Applied to Investments When
Corporate Deception Is Present?, 38 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 8 (2016).
100
101
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of the net loss where the taxpayer intends to pursue recovery from
a third party.109 However, specified third parties do not include:
(1) the individual perpetrators of the fraud; (2) the investment
vehicles or other entities that perpetrated the fraud, including its
employees, officers, and directors; (3) a liquidation, receivership,
bankruptcy, or similar estate established with respect to the
individuals who perpetrated the fraud; and (4) parties subject to
claims brought by a trustee, receivership, bankruptcy, or other
estate described in (3) above.110 Actual and expected recoveries
from third parties reduce the fraud loss, and recoveries in excess
of the remaining 5 percent or 25 percent loss are declared as income
in the year of recovery under the tax benefit rule.111
3. State Law Definition of Theft
Relying on the precedent set by the 1956 Edwards case,112
a taxpayer must generally establish that a theft has occurred as
defined by state law to deduct a theft loss on a federal income tax
return.113 In Edwards, the taxpayer gave a third party over $50,000
to bet on a rigged horse race in Georgia.114 That third party embezzled the money instead of betting it.115 The government argued
that the taxpayer’s loss did not meet the definition of a theft under
Georgia state law.116 The Fifth Circuit rejected the government’s
argument, stating that the term “theft” should be construed
broadly, covering “any criminal appropriation of another’s property to the use of the taker, particularly including theft by swindling, false pretenses, and any other form of guile”117 as interpreted
under “the law of the jurisdiction where it was sustained.”118
Many potential theft case rulings involve lengthy discussions
about whether a theft met the state definition,119 but, other than
Rev. Proc. 2009-20, 2009-14 I.R.B. 749.
Elzweig et al., supra note 108, at 8.
111 Id.
112 Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 111 (5th Cir. 1956).
113 See Taylor, supra note 101, at 229.
114 Edwards, 232 F.2d at 109.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 110.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 111.
119 See Goeller v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 534, 540 (2013) (citing, e.g.,
Alioto v. Comm’r, 699 F.3d 948, 955 (6th Cir. 2012); Estate of Meriano v. Comm’r,
109
110
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an axiomatic reliance on that one sentence from the Edwards
ruling, they omit an explanation justifying why state law definitions should be given higher weight than the federal definition
of “theft.”120
4. Intent and Privity
The IRS has been able to successfully argue under most
state laws that the use of an intermediary, like a stockbroker,
generally disqualifies the taxpayer from claiming the theft loss
because there is no direct privity121 between the perpetrator and
the victim. For example, in Taghadoss v. Commissioner, the taxpayer purchased stock and exercised options through WorldCom’s
employee stock purchase plan and 401(k), which while set up by
WorldCom, was technically a different corporation than WorldCom itself.122 It was later discovered that WorldCom’s financial
statements were fraudulent, and WorldCom filed for bankruptcy.123
The taxpayer claimed a theft loss, reasoning that the false financial statements from a related corporation amounted to a
fraud, and thus a theft, against investors.124 The IRS denied
Taghadoss’s theft loss deduction, arguing that while WorldCom
executives committed fraud, Virginia law required privity, which
the taxpayer did not have since he did not buy the stock directly
from the corporation.125 In doing so, the court stated that “a corporation is a taxable entity separate from its shareholders. Consequently, shareholders generally cannot claim a deduction for a
theft loss where the corporation itself was the victim of the
theft.”126 Similarly, the court sided with the IRS, relying on
Paine v. Commissioner.127 In Paine, the court reasoned that since
the stock of a company was purchased from the open market,
142 F.3d 651, 658 (3d Cir. 1998); Bellis v. Comm’r, 540 F.2d 448, 449 (9th Cir.
1976); Stoltz v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 2d 734, 740–41 (S.D. Ind. 2006)).
120 Edwards, 232 F.2d 107, 111 (5th Cir. 1956).
121 The term “privity” means mutual or successive relationship to the same
rights of property. Privity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1199 (6th ed. 1990).
122 Taghadoss v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-44, at *1 (2008).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at *3.
126 Id. at *4.
127 See Paine v. Comm’r, 63 T.C. 736, 736 (1975).
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the taxpayer lacked evidence that anyone intended to directly
deceive him as required under state law.128 In Willey v. Commissioner, a taxpayer loaned money to three corporations which
invested that money in fraudulent trust funds.129 The corporations, as separate taxpayers, were allowed the theft loss, not the
Willeys, who owned the corporations.130 Contrast these results to
that of Vietzke v. Commissioner,131 in which a taxpayer purchased
stock directly from the directors of the fraudulent corporation,
where a loss may have been allowed because “a theft occurred
both within the meaning of [state] law and of § 165(e) ....”132 A
theft loss was also allowed in Jensen v. Commissioner,133 where
the taxpayer was defrauded in a Ponzi scheme and the seller of
the stock unknowingly acted as a feeder for the fraudulent company.134 While there was privity in this case, the court implied
that it should not be necessary for “an investor [to] have direct
contact with the entity in which he is investing. It is not uncommon for investors to deal only with their brokers and never
have direct contact with their investments. In such cases, the
brokers act as conduits for the investors’ funds.”135
In Goeller v. United States, the Federal Claims Court opined
that a narrow construction of whether a fraud is a theft loss
solely under state law is “shibboleth,” and should be reconsidered.136 In that case, California-based taxpayers had invested in
an Ohio real estate company.137 When irregularities in the reporting of certain mortgages and properties arose, the taxpayers
See id. at 741–42, 742 n.12.
See Willey v. Comm’r, T.C.M. 1998-58, at *1 (1998).
130 See id. at *2.
131 See Vietzke v. Comm’r, 37 T.C. 504, 504 (1961).
132 Id. at 504.
133 See Jensen v. Comm’r, T.C.M. 1993-393, at *5 (1993).
134 See id. at *4–5.
135 Id. at *5; Halvor N. Adams III, Request for Legal Opinion, 1995 FSA
LEXIS 560 (Aug. 30, 1995) (original citations omitted) (Brokers are conduits
“only if they have no control over the disposition of the assets and no potential benefit to be gained from the assets by holding them”); see also Willey,
T.C.M. 1998-58 at *1 (finding that when a taxpayer loaned money to three
corporations, which invested that money in fraudulent trust funds, the corporations were allowed the theft loss but the taxpayer was limited to capital
loss treatment).
136 See Goeller v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 534 (2013).
137 See id. at 536.
128
129

2017]

MAXIMIZING PONZI LOSS DEDUCTIONS

17

filed amended tax returns claiming theft loss deductions.138 Both
the IRS and the taxpayer cited state authority for the proposition
of whether a “theft” had occurred, for purposes of § 165(c)(3).139
However, they disputed whether the controlling law was that of
Ohio or California.140 Rather than determine which state law
was definitive, the court noted that for the other § 165(c) events
(fire, storm, shipwreck, and casualty), the plain meaning of the
terms determines whether there is a loss that is deductible.141
Per Black’s Law Dictionary, the plain meaning of “fraud” is a
crime in which one “obtains possession of property by lawful means
and thereafter appropriates the property to the taker’s own
use.”142 The court found no Congressional intent143 to support
the sole reliance on state law144 but found a “plethora of Federal
statutes that criminalized thefts; [including] various forms of
larceny, embezzlement, fraud, and robbery; as well as money
laundering, wire fraud, and other conduct associated with such
crimes.”145 Further, most “courts have refused to make the operation of federal statutes referring to crimes dependent on a specific
state’s law.”146 That is, reliance solely on state law definitions of
fraud is, according to the court, “shibboleth.”147 Allowing for the
use of a federal common law definition of theft for federal tax
administration would also be equitable because “the victims of
securities fraud crimes prosecuted under Federal law might not
See id. at 537–38.
See id. at 539.
140 See id.
141 See id. at 540. This reasoning predates, but is consistent with, the reasoning in Estate of Heller v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. No. 11, at *3 (2016).
142 Goeller, 109 Fed. Cl. at 542 (quoting Theft, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1648 (4th ed. 1951)).
143 See H.R. REP. No. 99-841, at II-342-43 (1986) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. No.
99-313 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 658 (1985); H.R. REP. No. 83-2543
(1954); S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 23, 198 (1954) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. REP. No. 831337, at 21, A46 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 64-1200 (1916); S. REP. No. 64-793
(1916); H.R. REP. No. 64-922 (1916).
144 Goeller, 109 Fed. Cl. at 544–45.
145 Id. at 545.
146 Id. at 544.
147 See id. at 540. A shibboleth is defined as an old idea, opinion, or saying
that is commonly believed and repeated but that may be seen as old-fashioned or
untrue. Shibboleth, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (2017), http://www
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/shibboleth [https://perma.cc/WWN4-JS67].
138
139
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qualify for deductions under § 165(c)(3) because their losses would
not be viewed as resulting from thefts under state law.”148
However, in Adkins v. United States,149 the plaintiffs suffered an uncontested fraud loss that the IRS denied based on lack
of privity.150 The taxpayer’s main contention was that the loss on
securities was a fraud loss because, while the transactions in
question were brokered, they were purchased on the advice of
the fraudster. The judge ruled that “the perpetrator must have
had the specific intent to deprive the victim of his property,”
citing Goeller151 and noting:
Most courts analyzing whether a particular criminal act constitutes a theft for the purposes of I.R.C. § 165 refer to state law,
but in a recent decision, the Honorable Francis M. Allegra of this
court determined that the definition of theft should be derived
from federal common law ... because plaintiffs purchased
stock at the behest of one of [the fraudster’s] brokers ... thirdparty brokers may have acted merely as conduits for plaintiffs’ funds. See Jensen v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1993-393, 66
T.C.M 543, 546 (1993) (noting that “[t]here is no requirement
that an investor have direct contact with the entity in which
he is investing”), aff’d, 72 F.3d 135 (9th Cir. 1995).152

The judge noted that where the plaintiffs could demonstrate that they purchased stock from brokers who were controlled by the fraudsters, they may be able to establish privity.153
However, where stock purchases were made solely on the advice
of brokers, the judge ruled that there was no privity, granting
the IRS’s request for summary judgment against taking a theft
loss deduction.154
Goeller, 109 Fed. Cl. at 545 n.29 (citing Brian Elzweig & Valrie Chambers,
Modernizing the Theft Loss Deduction for Victims of Securities Frauds and
Ponzi Schemes, 30 No. 9 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 1, 7 (Sept. 2011)).
149 See Adkins v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 797, 804 (2013).
150 See id. Or, if meeting the criteria for being a fraud loss, did not meet
the requirements in the year the fraud loss was claimed. Id.
151 See Goeller, 109 Fed. Cl. at 545.
152 Adkins, 113 Fed. Cl. at 804 n.9.
153 See id. at 805.
154 See id. at 806. For further discussion on the history of the theft loss, see
generally Elzweig et al., supra note 108.
148
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III. ESTATE TAX AND INCOME TAX CODE SECTIONS NEED NOT
BE INTERPRETED CONSISTENTLY
The court was correct in asserting that Heller was a case
of first impression and that no regulation or legislative history
regarding § 2054 discusses whether an estate is entitled to a loss
due to a theft that occurred during the settlement of an estate.155
However, the opinion does not address why the court chose to
have its analysis “begin[ ] and end[ ]with the statute.”156 When
construing a statute in a case of first impression, a court does
look to the language of the statute itself first and, secondly, to
the legislative history.157 If there is no legislative intent to the
contrary, the plain meaning of the words used controls.158 However,
if the language of a statute is ambiguous, the court may resolve
this ambiguity using secondary sources to interpret congressional
intent.159 In cases involving administrative agencies, the statute’s
administering agency provides an interpretation of congressional
intent.160 If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the court must decide whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.161
By having the analysis begin and end with the statute,
the tax court is implicitly stating that § 2054 is unambiguous as
to its meaning. Section 2054 reads, in relevant part, “the value
of the taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the
value of the gross estate losses incurred during the settlement of
estates arising from fires, storms, shipwrecks, or other casualties; or from theft, when such losses are not compensated for by
insurance or otherwise.”162 In Heller, the IRS argued Madoff
Securities committed a fraud; it was perpetrated against JHF,
not the Estate, and therefore, the Estate was not the victim of
the fraud.163 JHF, even though owned mostly by the Estate, was
See Estate of Heller v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. No. 11, at *2 (2016).
Id.
157 See North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312 (1983).
158 See Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 211–12 (1985).
159 See, e.g., In re Baron, 165 F. Supp. 186, 187 (1958).
160 See Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
161 See id.
162 I.R.C. § 2054 (2012).
163 See Estate of Heller v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. No. 11, at *2 (2016).
155
156
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an entity separate from the Estate. In addition, as not being wholly
owned by the Estate, it would not be considered a disregarded
entity for tax purposes.164 This is important, because it is similar to
another line of cases,165 such that if the court had found § 2054
ambiguous in its plain reading, the court may have interpreted
this case differently.
Section 2054 is substantially similar in its structure to
§ 165(c), which describes the casualty losses (including losses
derived from theft) deduction for individuals.166 Section 165(c)
allows for a deduction for “losses of property not connected with
a trade or business or a transaction entered into for profit, if
such losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty,
or from theft.”167 Both statutes permit that losses are deductible
when they arise from theft. In Heller, the court noted that the
term “loss” means “the disappearance or diminution of value.”168
Although both sides agreed in Heller that there was a loss because JHF lost its sole asset in the Ponzi scheme, there was disagreement between the parties regarding who actually incurred
the loss.169 The IRS claimed that the loss belonged JHF, not the
Estate, because under New York law, JHF, as an entity separate
from the Estate, was the victim of the theft.170 The Estate claimed
that it too was a victim, because the value of the Estate was diminished by the amount of money that was lost when the value
of JHF fell in tandem with its sole asset, the investment in the
Ponzi scheme.171 The court, again using a plain reading interpretation, sided with the Estate by looking at the “arising from”
language in § 2054.172 The court sided with the Estate and allowed for a broad nexus between the theft and the incurred loss,
stating that “‘arise’ is generally defined as ‘to originate from a
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 2016).
See Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *2.
166 Compare I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (Supp. II 2012), with I.R.C. § 2054 (2012).
167 Id. § 165(c)(3).
168 See Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *2 (citing Loss, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1087 (10th ed. 2014)).
169 See id.
170 See id.
171 See id.
172 See id.
164
165
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source.’”173 Further, the court stated “[t]he loss suffered by the
estate relates directly to its JHF interest, the worthlessness of
which arose from the theft.”174
This plain reading interpretation of § 2054 is at odds with
the interpretation of the similar provisions in § 165(c)(3).175 Starting
with Edwards, most decisions on what constitutes a theft loss
require that there must be a theft under the law of the state in
which the theft occurred.176 In order for there to be a theft under
state law, there must have been intent to deprive the person
claiming the theft.177 Cases under § 165(c)(3) have consistently
required that there be a direct nexus between the thief and the
taxpayer in order to claim a theft loss deduction.178 In Edwards
and its progeny, this nexus has been construed narrowly, requiring direct privity between the thief and the victim.179 Any break in
the privity, such as a brokered securities transaction, would disallow the deduction based on theft.180 In Heller, the IRS suggests
that the privity requirement under § 165(c)(3) should apply to
§ 2054 by arguing that JHF incurred the loss instead of the Estate.181 In Heller, the court, instead of requiring the nexus between the thief and the taxpayer, only required a nexus between
the loss and the Estate (which is the taxpayer).182
The court in Heller, if it decided to use case law under
§ 165(c)(3), could easily have used an analysis similar to the one
used in Taghadoss and determined that the Estate and the LLC
were separate entities. Under that reasoning, with only JHF
and not the Estate being in privity with Madoff Securities, the
Estate could have been denied the theft loss. Instead, the only
Id. (quoting Arise, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 62
(10th ed. 2001)).
174 Id. (emphasis in original).
175 I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (Supp. II 2012); id. § 2054 (2012).
176 See Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 111 (5th Cir. 1956).
177 See, e.g., Taghadoss v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-44, at *3 (2008).
178 Anne-Marie Rhodes, On Art Theft, Tax, and Time: Triangulating Ownership Disputes Through the Tax Code, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 525 (2006);
see also discussion supra Section II.A.4.
179 See, e.g., Taghadoss, T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-44 at *4.
180 See Edwards, 232 F.2d at 111.
181 See Estate of Heller v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. No. 11, at *2 (2016).
182 Id. at *2.
173

22

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:001

case that the Tax Court did cite under § 165(c)(3) was White.183
White centered on a diamond that was lost from a ring as a result of the owner’s hand being slammed in a door.184 The owner
of the diamond claimed that the loss was an uninsured casualty
loss under § 165(c)(3).185 The court held that the loss was the
direct result of an “other casualty” under § 165(c)(3).186 The Heller
court used this case to determine that all that was needed to
establish a casualty was a nexus between the loss and the casualty itself.187 In doing so, the Court addressed neither the cases
under § 165(c)(3) dealing with theft, nor the issue of privity.188
Instead of appealing the decision in Heller, the IRS let it
stand. There are several reasons the IRS may have decided not
to appeal. The first reason is that this decision will not have
much precedential value as it is a rare occurrence. Section 2054
was originally adopted in 1954.189 Since Heller was a case of first
impression, and it occurred sixty-two years after the adoption of
the statute, the IRS could find that there would not be long-term
benefits in executing an appeal. Also, the facts in Heller are peculiar. To have precedential value in future interpretations of
§ 2054, it could be argued that Heller would be limited to a case
in which there is an estate that owns another entity, such as an
LLC and when a theft of the assets of the entity occurred between the time of the death of the owner of the entity and the
distribution of the entity by the estate.
Second, the IRS may have assumed that JHF could be seen
as the equivalent of a conduit to the Estate. This would be easier
if JHF was 100 percent owned by the Estate, and therefore, a
disregarded entity for federal taxation purposes.190 In Jensen v.
Commissioner, Jensen invested in a seafood importing business
after being approached by a business associate named Howarter.191
Id.
White v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 430, 432 (1967).
185 Id. at 432ï33.
186 Id. at 435.
187 Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *2.
188 See id.
189 I.R.C. § 2054 (2012).
190 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2) (as amended in 2016).
191 Jensen v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 543, 544 (1993), aff’d, 72 F.3d 135
(9th Cir. 1995).
183
184
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Howarter brokered the investment for Jensen, instead of Jensen
dealing directly with the seafood business.192 The business turned
out to be a Ponzi scheme, and Jensen lost all of his investment.193 The court held that even though Jensen did not deal
directly with the business, he could deduct a loss for the theft in
the transaction.194 This was because the court determined that
Jensen giving money to Howarter, as many other people did, for
the sole purpose of investing in the business, established that
Howarter was acting as a conduit for the business.195 In Heller’s
case, it could be argued that JHF was set up as a conduit solely
for the owners to invest in Madoff Securities.196 Upon the death
of the decedent, JHF became ninety-nine percent owned by the
Estate.197 If JHF were seen as a conduit, then the Estate would
have the same privity as JHF itself with Madoff Securities, and
would therefore be likely to reap the same tax deductions.198
This argument would be more likely to be successful, however, if
the Estate owned one hundred percent of JHF. A solely owned
LLC is considered a disregarded entity for federal income tax
purposes, meaning that the LLC and the owner are considered
to be a combined, single entity.199
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the IRS may be
afraid that Heller, if confirmed on appeal, would be seen as precedential to weaken the nexus requirement under § 165(c)(3). The
precedential value of cases under § 165(c)(3) was questioned in
Goeller,200 using much of the same argument, with the court
implying that the plain meaning of the statute could allow it to
be interpreted in ways other than Edwards and its progeny. The
judge went so far as to call the requirement of using state law a
shibboleth.201 The further requirement of privity was not tested
Id. at 544ï45.
Id.
194 Id. at 546.
195 Id.
196 This would be an extension of the brokerage argument in Jensen. See id.
197 Estate of Heller v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. No. 11, at *1 (2016).
198 See discussion of Jensen, supra Part III.
199 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2) (as amended in 2016).
200 Goeller v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 534, 540 (2013).
201 Id.
192
193
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in Goeller, but the same analysis that led to the state law requirement could logically be expanded to the privity requirement.202 If an appellate court were to affirm the lack of need for
a direct nexus under § 2054, then the same logic may be applied to
theft losses under § 165.203 This could allow for a great expansion
of losses that might be considered thefts, including securities
frauds where the securities were bought in a brokered transaction.204 In Goeller, there was a direct investment between the
taxpayer and a company called CPR.205 CPR was supposed to buy
property with the money that was being invested, but some of the
property was never bought.206 Goeller claimed this was a theft
and took a deduction for the loss under § 165(c)(3) on his federal
income taxes.207 The court, in examining Goeller’s claims, explained that Edwards and its progeny created a shibboleth by
repeating that to have a theft loss, the theft incurred must meet
the state law definition in the state where the theft occurred.208
A shibboleth, the court explained, is something that is repeated
so often that it becomes accepted as a truth even though it may
be outmoded.209 Instead of considering the state law requirement as
axiomatic, the judge examined the legislative history of § 165.210
Similar to Judge Foley’s examination of the legislative history of
§ 2054 in Heller, the Goeller court determined that there was nothing compelling the court to rely on anything other than the plain
Elzweig et al., supra note 108, at 26.
See id.
204 For example, the court in Taghadoss might have held a lack of privity
between the taxpayers and WorldCom unimportant, resulting in their ability
to claim a theft loss deduction under § 165(c)(3). Taghadoss v. Comm’r, T.C.
Summ. Op. 2008-44, at *3 (2008). This would have made the result in Taghadoss
similar to that of Vietzke, in which privity was not an issue because the case
involved securities purchased directly, without a broker, from the company in
which a fraud occurred. Vietzke v. Comm’r, 37 T.C. 504, 511 (1961). Therefore, a
theft loss deduction was allowed. Id. For further discussion of Taghadoss and
Vietzke, see supra Section II.B.4.
205 Goeller, 109 Fed. Cl. at 536.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 538.
208 Id. at 540.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 540ï41.
202
203
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meaning of the statute.211 The court in Goeller then determined
that the definitions of theft in both Black’s Law Dictionary and
Webster’s New International Dictionary would suffice, and there
was no reason to reference the crimes of a particular state to
define theft.212 Since there is nothing in the legislative history to
require privity between the person committing a theft and the
victim (which was not at issue in Goeller), presumably the Goeller
court would have seen this requirement as a shibboleth as well.213
The IRS in Heller claimed that under New York law, the theft
occurred against JHF, not the Estate, and that this breaks the
privity between the loss and the Estate.214 Because § 165(c)(3) is
substantially similar to § 2054,215 it would seem that using the
plain meaning to interpret one would allow for using the plain
meaning to interpret the other. This may allow for future courts to
apply a plain meaning reading to § 165(c)(3) and only require a
nexus between the loss and the taxpayer. This could greatly expand the types of cases that are brought under § 165(c)(3) for theft
losses, including cases of securities fraud where there were brokered transactions. Since the IRS has taken the position, and courts
have agreed since the Edwards case in 1956, that to claim a theft
there has to be a direct nexus between the taxpayer and the loss,
this would be a major change.216 To bolster its decision in Heller,
the court noted that its interpretation is in line with the purpose
of the estate tax which is “to ensure ‘that the tax is imposed on
the net estate, which is really what of value passes from the
dead to the living.’”217 This assumes that the estate’s value is the
net of what is passed to the estate, less any deduction during the
administration of the estate, including any theft diminishing
value of an asset of the estate during the administration, which
then leaves the remainder passed to the heirs.218 It would seem
Id. at 540.
Id. at 542–43.
213 See Elzweig et al., supra note 108, at 26.
214 Estate of Heller v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. No. 11, at *2 (2016).
215 Compare I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (2012), with I.R.C. § 2054 (2012).
216 See supra Section II.B.4 for discussion of the privity requirement.
217 See Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *3 (quoting Jacobs v. Comm’r, 34 B.T.A.
594, 597 (1936)).
218 See id. at *2.
211
212
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then that a theft of an asset of an individual would then lower
the value of that individual’s estate by the amount of the theft in
that year.219 This could lead the IRS to fear an appeal, which
may overturn the precedent synonymous with its longstanding
position regarding theft loss deductions under § 165(c)(3).
IV. WHAT IF THE FRAUD HAD BEEN DISCOVERED IN ANOTHER YEAR?
Currently in income tax cases, the verdicts generally rely
on the definition of theft used by the courts before them, which
in turn is based on varying state laws stemming from simpler
times when tangible property resided in a single state until (and
perhaps after) it was stolen.220 On the surface, the LLC, as a
presumably pass-through entity, would be entitled to a theft loss
under the safe harbor rules and would pass that loss through to
the estate for income tax purposes.221 However, the LLC’s fraud
loss might not have been categorized as the estate’s theft loss
under § 165(c) for income tax purposes, because the plain meaning of § 165(c) is not used.222 Instead, New York state law, which
requires privity between the fraudster and the victim, might be
interpreted to mean that the LLC or the estate was not entitled
to a theft loss, but instead entitled to a capital loss, due to lack
of privity by both parties.223 The fraud loss would be a deductible theft loss in determining the taxable estate under § 2054.224
Thus, we have divergent interpretations of different I.R.C. sections with very similar wording.
When Heller died, and how the fraud loss is treated for
income tax purposes, are material factors in how the family is
taxed. The effect of Heller’s death immediately before the discovery of the fraud (center row) is contrasted against what would
have happened had Heller died just one year earlier or later in
the table below.
Id.
Rev. Rul. 72-112, 1972-1 C.B. 60.
221 See Rev. Proc. 2009-20 § 4.03(4), 2009-14 I.R.B. 749.
222 For discussion regarding the interpretation of § 165(c), see supra Section II.B.1.
223 See supra Section II.B.4 (the estate did not directly incur the loss, and
the LLC did not directly invest in the Ponzi scheme).
224 See I.R.C. § 2054 (2012); Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *2ï3.
219
220
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Income Tax Treatment of $5,175,990 Loss

What if
Heller is
alive
when the
fraud is
discovered?

What if
the estate
is open
when the
fraud is
discovered?

What if
the fraud
is not
discovered
until after
the estate
is closed?

27
Estate Tax
Treatment
Fraud Loss Is
Treated as
Theft Loss

Fraud Loss Is
Treated as Capital Loss

Fraud Loss Is
Treated as Theft Loss

Heller gets a $3,000 loss in the
year before death, and $3,000 in the
year of death. Capital losses for personal individual income tax returns are
limited to $3,000 in excess of capital
gains, if any, for the year. The remaining ($5,175,990 – $3,000) = $5,172,990
capital loss carryforward to the following year, which is the year of death.
That carryforward capital loss is again
limited to $3,000 in excess of capital
gains, if any, for the year. The remaining ($5,172,990 – $3,000) = $5,169,990
loss is permanently unused because
capital loss carryforwards do not
carry from a living individual to their
estate at death.225
The estate gets a $3,000 loss each
year that the estate is open, which is
usually one year. The remaining
$5,172,990 loss passes through to the
heirs for their use at the rate of $3,000
per year in excess of capital gains until the loss is exhausted or the heirs
die. The unused balance at heirs’ death
is permanently lost. If Heller’s adult
heirs were to live fifty years more
each and have no capital gains, the
would use (50 x 2 x $3,000) = $300,000,
leaving $4,872,990 permanently
unused.228
The heirs each get a $3,000 per
year in excess of capital gains until the
loss is exhausted or the heirs die. The
unused balance at heirs’ death is
permanently lost. If Heller’s adult heirs
were to live fifty years more each and
have no capital gains, they would use
(50 x 2 x $3,000) = $300,000, leaving
$4,875,990 permanently unused.231

Heller takes
$5,175,990 as a loss
against current income, possibly creating an NOL which
can be carried back
two years, with any
excess carried forward to the next year.
Remaining NOL, if
any, is permanently
unused because NOL
carryforwards do not
carry from a living
individual to their estate at death.226

Fraud
loss permanently reduces the
size of the
estate subject to
tax.227

The estate takes
$5,175,990 as a loss
against current income. Any unused loss
passes through to the
heirs to use, possibly creating an NOL
which can be carried
back two years with
any excess carried forward twenty years.229

Fraud
loss permanently reduces the
size of the
estate subject to
tax.230

Heirs split the
$5,175,990 loss against
current income, possibly creating an NOL
which can be carried
back two years with
any excess carried forward for up to twenty
years.232

Fraud
loss permanently
reduces the
size of the
heirs’ estate subject
to tax.233

See § 1211(b); id. § 1212(b); I.R.S. Instructions for Schedule D, Cat. No.
24331I (Oct. 19, 2016).
226 See I.R.C. § 172(b) (2012).
227 See Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *3 (interpreting I.R.C. § 2054).
228 See Treas. Reg. § 1.642(h)-1 (1978).
229 See § 172(b)(1)(A).
230 See Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *3 (interpreting I.R.C. § 2054).
231 See I.R.C. § 1211(b)(1) (2012).
232 See id. § 172(b)(1)(A).
233 See Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *3 (interpreting I.R.C. § 2054).
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Clearly, Heller’s family is unaffected by when the fraud is
discovered (Column 4) and better off if the plain meaning of theft
loss is also used for income tax purposes (Column 3 vs. Column 2).
Heller is worse off for income tax purposes if the fraud is discovered immediately before his death (Row 2 versus Rows 3 and 4).
For purposes of the current income tax treatment of fraud losses
only, Heller was better off dead than having lived just long enough
for the fraud to be uncovered.
CONCLUSION
Saved income is taxed once under the income tax structure when earned, and again, to the extent it is saved, under the
estate tax structure.234 Both structures allow deductions arising
from theft. However, there is a difference in courts’ interpretations as to whether a securities fraud is deductible as a theft
loss.235 Individuals traditionally have had to show privity between themselves and the fraudster because theft is traditionally
defined through state law, which required privity.236 In the case
of estates, the Tax Court placed reliance on the plain meaning of
the statute, not the indirect logic of case history, which one
judge called a shibboleth.237 Indeed, for income tax purposes, the
plain meaning of theft, and the absence of legislative requirement
to use state law, may be more compelling than a footnote in a
single court case, even if that court case is cited repeatedly.238 In
the meantime, the estate tax interpretation of whether a theft
loss exists in the case of fraud is more victim-friendly than the
current, most frequent, income tax interpretation of whether a
theft loss exists for individuals. As such, for tax purposes, a victim of fraud, arguably, may be better off dead.
See I.R.C. § 2001(a) (2012).
Under the line of cases interpreting I.R.C. § 165(c)(3), a theft loss is only
deductible for income tax purposes if the state definition of theft is satisfied.
See supra Section II.B.3–4. However, under Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *3,
securities fraud would be deductible as a theft loss in the estate tax context.
236 See Taghadoss v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-44, at *3 (2008).
237 See Heller, 147 T.C. No. 11 at *2; Goeller v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl.
534, 540 (2013).
238 See Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 111 (5th Cir. 1956).
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